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Abstract
Contemporary infectious disease surveillance systems aim to employ the speed and
scope of big data in an attempt to provide global health security. Both shifts - the
perception of health problems through the framework of global health security and
the corresponding technological approaches – imply epistemological changes,
methodological ambivalences as well as manifold societal effects. Bringing
current findings from social sciences and public health praxis into a dialogue,
this conversation style contribution points out several broader implications of
changing disease surveillance. The conversation covers epidemiological issues
such as the shift from expert knowledge to algorithmic knowledge, the securitization of
global health, and the construction of new kinds of threats. Those developments are
detailed and discussed in their impacts for health provision in a broader sense.
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Introduction
The term digital epidemiology is in this special compilation defined by Marcel Salathe
as epidemiology that uses data that was generated outside the public health system, i.e.
with data that was not generated with the primary purpose of doing epidemiology
(Salathe 2018). Arguably a narrow definition, we will use this conceptualization as the
starting point for our conversation. The so defined digital epidemiology promises faster
detection of disease outbreaks and improved surveillance as well as reduction in ad-
ministrative and financial burden, among other things. At hand in the following con-
versation is less the question if those promises are kept. Instead we are interested to
reflect epistemological/methodological, ethical/legal, social/political, and organizational
aspects and implications corresponding to the promise of digital epidemiology. What
will be the relationship of traditional and digital epidemiology? Will a possible change
influence the scope of Public Health and Global Health? Tim Eckmanns, Henning
Füller and Stephen Roberts discuss political implications of digital epidemiology.
Tim
Digital infectious disease early detection systems such as the ProMed-mail, Global
Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), HealthMap, the now closed Google Flu
Trends or the syndromic surveillance system ESSENCE are central elements of global
public health surveillance.
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However, with increasingly digitalized (algorithmic) global public health surveillance
systems and related data-driven epidemiological analyses (e.g., Digital Epidemiology
and other research methodologies), there seem to emerge epistemological shifts, as well
as methodological ambivalences and diverse social and political effects.
You, Henning and Stephen, both work from a social (or rather political) science
perspective on the societal implications of Digital Epidemiology, which is shaped by
multiple imperatives, e.g., of ‘global health security’ as well the potentials of big data.
Stephen
Over the past two decades, I would argue, we have seen an unleashing of the algorithm
across practices of health security and surveillance. Algorithmically-guided infectious disease
surveillance systems have proliferated across global health geographies, seemingly in re-
sponse to a series of interconnected and complex transformations within global health gov-
ernance (GHG), as well as the practice of international relations and international security.
We have seen the rise of a seeming ‘epidemic of epidemics’ from the late twentieth century
onward, including the emergence of HIV-AIDS, novel strains of avian and swine influenza,
SARS, Ebola, MERS, the Zika virus, and the re-emergence of cholera, polio and multi-drug
resistant Tuberculosis across low and middle income countries (LMICs) clinical and public
health surveillance practices with their routinised processes of data collection, analysis, and
dissemination from national health institutes have increasingly fallen out of pace with the
capacity to timely identify the globalised spread of novel and re-emergent pathogens.
Correspondingly, the rise of the digital era, resultant from technological interconnec-
tivity and innovation, has generated infinite, voluminous and diverse data at a rate
never feasible in history. Between 2016 and 2018, 2.5 quintillion bytes of data have been
produced continually, every day in the mere span 24months (IBM 2018). Celebrated
for the capacity to connect the operational ‘dots’ between these seemingly unintelligible
and largely unstructured streams of data in the surveillance and identification of infec-
tious disease outbreaks, the algorithm has emerged as salient and novel technology of
security in the pre-emption of pandemic threats in the twenty-first century.
To firstly illustrate this shift, in late November 2002, the Global Public Health
Intelligence Network (GPHIN), a semi-automated online health surveillance system,
which piloted the use of retrieval algorithms to filter international media sources, identi-
fied the early reporting of a form of atypical pneumonia circulating in Guangdong
Province, China. The ‘algorithmic gaze’ of GPHIN identified the origins of the severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in advance of 3 months of traditional public health and gov-
ernance authorities. More than a decade following the rapid spread of SARS, HealthMap,
an online health surveillance system, identified again, via algorithmic processing of digital
data streams, the emergence of a mysterious hemorrhagic fever occurring in Macenta,
Guinea. HealthMap critically captured and presented strategic epidemic intelligence detail-
ing the emergence of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) on 14 March 2014, 9 days in advance
of the official notification of outbreak by the Guinean health authorities.
Digital epidemiology - from expert knowledge to ‘knowledge without truth’
The increasing integration of algorithmically-driven infectious disease surveillance sys-
tems contemporary logics of health security are critical and significant for a number of
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reasons (Roberts and Elbe 2017). First, reflective of a growing recourse to the harnes-
sing of novel information sources to contain pandemic illness, the WHO, via the revi-
sion of the International Health Regulations (2005), has clearly authorised the
collection, assessment and utilisation of non-governmental sources of epidemic
intelligence and data (Article 9.1), without prior clearance of member-states. (World
Health Organization 2008) In this regard, the algorithm emerges a new purveyor of
varied, voluminous and expedited data sources to be leveraged in the risk assessment
of future infectious disease threats. Epistemically, what we can see is how the centralisa-
tion of the algorithm within security technologies such as digital disease surveillance sys-
tems re-contour previous relations and understandings of knowledge production, the
practice of surveillance and the regulation of pandemic risk. The cultivation of knowledge
to address the contingent within past ‘regimes of truth’ were largely sustained, as illus-
trated by Foucault by the ‘avalanche of statistical numbers’ (Hacking 1982). Increasingly
however, within these contemporary security technologies, the 3 Vs of Big Data (volume,
variety, and velocity) are now being mined, scanned, and reassembled via algorithmic pro-
cessing of data to produce findings and alerts on the next pandemic. Information and
‘truths’ about the physical world and the contingent threat of infectious disease are in-
creasingly extracted in the forms of signals and signs of the realm of the digital, and no
longer solely generated from statistical processes via human analysis.
Furthermore, as the conceptual work of Antoinette Rouvroy (2011, 2013, 2015), has
demonstrated, algorithms have emerged within health surveillance technologies as
purely ‘rational’ or ‘objective’ instruments of forecasting, indifferent to the causes of
phenomena and seeking only to accrue maximal reservoirs of data to address that
which constitutes the contingent or the uncertain. What this means therefore is infor-
mation and knowledge generated by these algorithmic techniques now appear to bypass
the traditions of human assessment, analysis, hypothesis, testing and trial which were
essential to the statistical calculation of the contingent. Rouvroy has referred to this
dissemination of this new form of understanding future-situated uncertainty as “know-
ledge without truth”, represented in the context of this discussion by disease tracking
systems including GPHIN and HealthMap, which have, with upward intensity sought
to apprehend infinitely expanding data sources through an intensified recourse to
algorithmic-suffused disease surveillance. What is absolutely vital to emphasise here is
that amid the widespread deployment of big data analytics and increasingly sophisti-
cated algorithms for tracing the next outbreak, little critical assessment has been for-
mulated by global health security theorists and practitioners on the ramifications
‘digital’ turn of health surveillance and the implications of big data and algorithmic sur-
veillance practices on individuals, populations and states.
Thus, these continued shifts towards employing advanced algorithms to make sense
of unprecedented amounts of information (Leese 2014), across practices of contempor-
ary disease surveillance must be continually matched with equally robust interrogations
of the unforeseen or unprecedented implications of securitization by algorithms in the
realms of ethics, law, politics and society.
Henning
Thanks, Stephen for underlining the function of algorithms in current approaches of
disease surveillance in global health policies. In addition, I pose that the rationale of an
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‘emerging diseases world view’ (King 2002) is similarly influential for public health sur-
veillance on a domestic scale. Especially in the US, systems of syndromic surveillance
have been explicitly employed to answer the challenges of the ‘next pandemic’ with a
new algorithmic form of public health monitoring. Going a bit into the details of one
specific example of Syndromic surveillance, I want to illustrate the problem of “know-
ledge without truth” Stephen mentioned above. The argument is that those systems ‘call
back’ in several ways, influencing both truth claims and practices of public health
provision. My empirical example is a study on the use of the “Electronic Surveillance
System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics” (ESSENCE) in the
U.S. National Capitol Region, an application of syndromic surveillance that received
considerable attention as a pilot project (Füller 2018).
Technically the ESSENCE system provides the server infrastructure to draw together
diverse data-sources that are considered indicative for public health. Its ‘syndromic’ ap-
proach consists in the integration of several so called surrogate data, signals of diseases
or public health problems generated before a confirmed medical diagnosis (Velasco et
al. 2014). In the case of ESSENCE, such surrogates are for example emergency depart-
ment chief complaints, daily over-the-counter sales of the two big pharmacy chains
CVS and Rite Aid, reports on absenteeism data gathered from public schools and
others. ESSENCE claims to provide an unmatched situational awareness partly due to
the near real-time nature of those data (collected and reported at least daily). Given the
amount and unstructured nature of this data, the system employs algorithms to con-
tinually search the gathered data-stream for unusual patterns and a GUI to visualize
and map resulting alerts. If there is an unusual coocurrence of for example the sale of
headache pills and school absenteeism in a region, the system will flag out a warning.
Importantly, the base for this pattern recognition are at no times diagnosed health
problems but assumptions generated through the association of different data sets.
Eventually the system promises to automatically provide an early notification of any un-
usual public health event before it has been medically diagnosed (Fearnley 2008).
The turn towards infection control and surveillance in public health and the intro-
duction of syndromic surveillance systems have both been contested early on and from
several vantage points (Reingold 2003). The focus here is to point out the performative
character of technologies and their related practices in altering the goals and modes of
public health provision.
My argument centers on the fact that the system is constantly producing health re-
lated truth claims. Whether it is just quietly monitoring – as it does most of the time –
or in the rare cases that it is flagging out a public health emergency, the system claims
a certain truth about the health of the monitored population. In both cases, the algo-
rithmically produced knowledge becomes performative in different ways. Both forms of
truth claims illustrate the ‘knowledge without truth’ problematic Stephen already
mentioned.
On the one hand, those systems introduce a new expectation and a demand to con-
stantly assure the normal state of affairs. New technologies of surveillance are
employed to be able to illustrate an absence, to be able to constantly assure that there
is nothing to worry about, as Kezia Barker argues (Barker 2014). In order to be aware
of unusual events, resources, work and infrastructure are invested to extensively moni-
tor the routine state of public health. But this additionally generated knowledge does
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not provide a qualified, actionable truth about the state of public health. Trying to see
short-term events, those systems measure against the baseline of the ‘normal’. In its
usually quiet mode of monitoring, the systems make the implicit claim about a ‘normal’,
‘well functioning’, ‘unproblematic’ state of public health, ignoring any long-term and
structural health issues.
On the other hand, In the case of actually flagging out an incidence, automated mon-
itoring systems such as ESSENCE are problematic in their rendering of disassociated
facts into medical truths. The threat of an emerging public health event is especially
burdening for the executive branch of the local state. Decision-makers are pressured to
act early, at best before the expected cascading of an infection gets out of control. This
expectation makes it tempting to base a decision on the syndromic signals as they are
readily available and - through the included mapping tool - often clearly localized.
While those signals are explicitly handled as an additional but clearly undiagnosed
source of information among epidemiologists and public health experts, for the execu-
tive branch they have a tempting appeal of providing a near real-time situational aware-
ness and as such an actionable grasp on the emerging public health event. Importantly,
using ESSENCE as a base for decision-making approaches the signal as if it was an au-
thoritative medical fact instead of just an indicator for the clustering of certain syn-
dromes. The danger of misinterpretation as the algorithmically generated knowledge
travels contexts may result in wrongly employed public health interventions with nega-
tive social effects. Besides the problem of false positives prevalent to those systems
(Fearnley 2008) the system always suggests a spatialized source of the problem that
may or may not be medically justified. Employing public health interventions based on
those seemingly objective and localized realities can easily mean the wrong allocation
of scarce resources and attention or effect an unjustified stigmatization of a ‘problem-
atic’ area.
Tim
From my perspective, as a medical infectious epidemiologist and public health expert who
advises on the development of new surveillance systems and who constantly needs to be
aware of their effectiveness as well as the consequences of their use, Stephen and Hen-
ning’s analyses offer extremely important contributions on how to think about and evalu-
ate increasingly digitized health- and infectious disease control. To add to this, I would, in
the following, like to make a few further comments about the epistemic and political as-
pects of the digitization of infection control. In particular, I am able to speak to activities
and experiences at Germany’s national public health institute, the Robert Koch Institute
(RKI), and to those at the World Health Organization (WHO), where I was within the
framework of the West African Ebola outbreak (2013 to 2016) (Owada et al. 2016).
First of all, I agree with Stephen’s analysis that there is the risk, as a result of the suc-
cessive propagation of algorithmic approaches and technologies for infectious disease
control, an epidemiology traditionally based on diagnostic findings and controlled stat-
istical processes is becoming increasingly marginalized and, in parallel, the necessary
verification loops are being replaced in favour of ‘Big Data’ ideologies and trends of
Dataification.1 In this context, it seems to me that widespread assumptions that ad-
vance the idea that a digital, unofficial infectious disease surveillance and monitoring is
quicker than traditional, official information and reporting systems need to be
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modified. It is true in retrospect that existing digital systems and their associated early
warnings could have been faster if their first signals had been correctly named or inter-
preted at an early stage. At the same time, however, it is mostly ignored that even offi-
cial state authorities often have knowledge about specific events at relatively early
stages – only that they either initially withhold such information or distribute it in
other ways according to the official information/notification systems, e.g. the example
of Stephen, the authorities of Guinea were aware that there was something going on,
but they waited with the reporting. So have I experienced it at the WHO: few countries
directly provided all available information to the organization. It can also be observed
again and again that official information either minimizes or plays to the media or
other entities in a targeted way. In this context, non-state surveillance platforms such
as ProMED or HealthMap, for example, should be commended especially for their di-
mension of political transparency, as they put pressure on governments not to keep in-
formation from the public as much as possible. At the same time, however, the
increasingly digitized identification, analysis and distribution of epidemiological indica-
tions of infectious disease these platforms enable not only leads to increasing likelihood
of false positives, but also to specific problems of an immediate, uncontrollable com-
munication of risk. The danger of panic and the great effort required to avoid panic are
to be feared.
Henning provides very important information in this regards. He describes that spe-
cific public health actors (here: local health authorities) may be compelled to equate
technologically-generated signals with epidemiologically certified public health events,
and, on the basis of these unproven indications, initiate public health measures. Fur-
ther, this is also a problematic development from the perspective of resource retention
in an already thinly-resourced public health service. Early responses and over-reactions
from political decision-makers or the media are to be feared in equal measure. In the
broader context of the focus and framework of a ‘Global Health Security’, such poten-
tially exaggerated perceptions and reactions are tied to perceptions of elevated threats
of infection – whether from (quasi) natural or man-made infection (e.g., in the context
of war or incidents of terror) – and, consequently, to urgent demands for comprehen-
sive and constant attention, outbreak detection, and further crisis/disaster preparedness
measures.
Digital epidemiology and the securitization of Global Health
As a result of this, infectious disease epidemiology is increasingly being, in my humble
opinion, in an irritating way integrated into the national and international security ar-
chitectures. So it was during the West African Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone and
Liberia, two of the three hardest hit countries, that the military was constantly present
in the planning of public health measures. E.g. in one situation in Sierra Leone I re-
member this resulted in prioritizing quarantining over other public health measure-
ments like community engagement. Quarantining is not per se negative but in this
particular case turned out very ambivalent as the measure evoked strong resistance
among the population and potential new infected individuals increasingly were actively
hidden as a consequence. Also in non-outbreak times, the cooperation between security
forces and public health entities is becoming increasingly narrow. This can be seen, for
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example, in the Global Health Security Initiative, which addresses both the biological
threats of pandemic flu and possible threats from chemical or radio-nuclear terrorism.
These perspectives as well as the social aspects and subsequent costs of a digitized in-
fection control should be discussed. They are closely linked to the imperatives of con-
stant monitoring and early detection, as well as the similar focus of a ‘Global Health
Security’. As such, they should be considered with the view not only to the (not new)
anticipated restrictions or marginalizations associated with classical, structural and also
socially-reformed, areas of public health, as well as to further possible negative costs
resulting from of a ‘securitized’ public health. I would like to hear from you - Stephen
and Henning - especially with regard to these broader health and social policy debates,
from your social science perspectives, what is your understanding of ‘Global Health Se-
curity’ in general and of the ‘preemptive security logic’, which is often discussed in this
context, especially?
Henning
I would suggest to understand “Global Health Security” as a set of preferences and
truth claims that are currently framing our understanding of health issues of inter-
national relevance. This understanding results from a perspective, that interrogates
threat discourses and related policies as a structured but contingent formation of prob-
lem descriptions. Problems do not exist ‘naturally’ but they have to be articulated and
put on the agenda in a process of social interaction. This approach draws back to
Michel Foucault and his proposal to acknowledge a power/knowledge nexus in general
and specifically the power effects of truth claims. According to this, articulating and
framing an issue are powerful ways to predetermine the range of thinkable approaches
and solutions. By using the term “Global Health”, policy-makers, non-governmental ac-
tors and academic observers are drawing together several health problems into a com-
mon frame, but also marking this frame as a field of intervention and claiming its
relevance. The contours of this frame are still blurry and there exist numerous ap-
proaches to define “Global Health” (Brown et al. 2006; Farmer et al. 2013; Fassin 2012).
There is no accepted definition and “Global health […] is more a bunch of problems
than a discipline”. (Kleinman 2010) The ongoing emergence of a problem field “Global
health” is an interesting moment then, where new truth claims are put forward and a
new understanding of related issues such as ‘health’ and ‘the global’ are formed. Those
newly related ideas are powerful as they are confining the agenda setting and plausible
goals and methods of intervention.
Approaching “Global health” from this angle, what is striking from the outset is a
strong undercurrent of security. The recent surge of “global health” can be attributed
to a confluence of two separate discourses. On the one hand, globalization is increas-
ingly narrated as a health risk. An “emerging diseases” discourse paints the picture of a
global spread of infectious diseases due to unparalleled levels of global connectivity and
frequency of global travel (Barrett et al. 1998). On the other hand, the concept of na-
tional security is being reimagined, facing a new multi-polar and complex world order.
Today, in order to achieve national security, one has to look beyond military domin-
ance and to take societal issues such as health, poverty but also climate change as se-
curity threats into account (Redclift and Grasso 2013). For example in the US, facing
the threat of bioterrorism, public health has become a concern for the Department of
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Homeland Security and international infection control resurfaced as a security issue.
Both the fear induced by ‘globalisation of disease’ and the rethinking of national secur-
ity are underlining a new relevance of global health issues. The resulting tremendous
development in global health policies and programs accordingly are often following a
security rationale (Genest 2015). One example is the newly installed global health sur-
veillance mechanisms and the revised international health regulations (IHR) (Fidler
2005). The recent conception presents global health as part of a security problem ra-
ther than as a humanitarian issue.
This securitization of ‘Global health’ has already been described in some detail (Cook
2010; King 2002; Pereira 2008). Here I want to underline the corresponding shift in the
perception of threats and its implications. Current problems of Global health security
are often depicted as essentially incalculable. Emerging diseases, acts of intentional Bio-
terrorism, food security in an increasingly global connected distribution system, anti-
microbial resistant agents, − more than ever we now seem to be confronted with
“unknown unknowns”. We not only do not know when those events will happen, but
we even do not know what the threat is exactly. The reformulated International Health
Regulations (IHR) tellingly have shifted from monitoring a fixed catalogue of diseases
to the obligation to warn about anything unexpected. According to the IHR, the na-
tional health agencies have now to signal any unspecific “public health emergencies of
international concern” (World Health Organization 2008) to the WHO. This specific
perception of “Global health security problems” as incalculable threats calls for a cer-
tain pre-emptive and outbreak-oriented intervention.
The implications of the employed “preemptive security” logic have been detailed in
critical security studies (de Goede and Randalls 2009; Lakoff and Collier 2010; Massumi
2007; Caduff 2015). As those studies have shown, preemption often demands the exten-
sion of (technological) surveillance and orients efforts towards the event and away from
structural conditions. Comparable tendencies have been shown for current “Global
health” policies, for example an orientation towards containment of an event rather
than the search for a broader structural prevention (Rushton 2011).
To sum it up, I would argue that Global Health is currently presented as a problem
and has been put on the political agenda in a way that calls for a very specific answer
in the form of a “preemptive security logic”. Firstly, the underlying truth claims about
the problems to solve frame the emerging field of Global health partly as security issue.
Secondly, the incalculability problem evoked in many threat discourses of current Glo-
bal health thinking demands a certain security rationale. The problem of an unknown
unknown has to be dealt with preemptively. This way of presenting the problem of
Global health then implicitly constraints plausible interventions. Approaching health as
a security issue does often not tackle the actual problems of health on the ground. For
example, this approach inclines to invest scarce resources into monitoring and surveil-
lance rather than education and local health infrastructure. In order to reach the goal
of more substantial health policies it is important to be aware of this securitization bias
in the current problematization of Global health.
Stephen
Building further on excellent points articulated by Henning, this epistemic shift in gov-
ernment and politics towards ‘global health security’ has been resultant, as I argue,
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from significant larger geopolitical transformations, and new reconsiderations of secur-
ity perspective, in a post-Cold War era of rapidly proliferating non-traditional security
challenges, which extend beyond traditional security correlations of the state/military,
are transnational or global in scope, and again, to underscore the centrality of Hen-
ning’s earlier points, which cannot be prevented entirely, only addressed through cop-
ing mechanisms and the development of techniques of preemption and forecasting
(Caballero-Anthony 2010).
The rise of global health security and its securitizing processes have transformed the
ways in which international relations and global politics are understood, orientated and
practiced. In 2000 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution
1308 (UNSC 2000) which emphasised that the current HIV/AIDS pandemic, if un-
checked, posed a risk to international security and stability, marking the first time in
which a health threat was discussed before the UN body mandated to maintain inter-
national peace and security (Fidler 2005). 14 years following the seminal Security Coun-
cil resolution on HIV/AIDS, the United Nations launched its first and only to date,
military mission to combat the spread of an infectious disease outbreak. Known as the
United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), the first ever UN
emergency health mission sought to contain the spiraling West African Ebola outbreak
following the UN Security Council Resolution 2177, which determined that the ongoing
outbreak in West Africa ‘constituted a threat to international peace and security’
(UNSC 2014), and we can understand these grand transformations within global polit-
ics and international relations as permeated by emergent logics to preempt both occur-
ring public health emergencies and also probable future pandemics.
Contrastingly, for critical theorists, global health security has emerged as a concept
which denotes a novel biopolitical project, or rather, the appearance of a new govern-
mental problem in public health: how to effectively manage ‘emerging infectious dis-
eases’ at a global scale (Lakoff 2015). Contemporary global health systems are therefore
problematized not only by the rapid emergence of pathogens on a global scale, but the
risk posed by these circulating pathogens are no longer calculable using tools of risk as-
sessment, which are based on patterns of historical incidence (ibid). In this regard, glo-
bal health security rationalities, I assert, galvanise and accelerate the facilitation and
development of novel techniques and practices of anticipatory or preemptive security,
which emphasise the real-time, continuous and cost-effective surveillance of potential
disease outbreak and public health emergencies.
Digital epidemiology as technologies of preemption
Increasingly, in an era of innumerable digital data sources, the preemption of health
risks are managed and analysed via an assemblage of innovative and evolving surveil-
lance practices which combine multiple data sources and disease-tracking techniques,
enacted at local, regional and global levels. Syndromic surveillance platforms, and
digital epidemic intelligence systems including ProMED-Mail, GPHIN, HealthMap, Bio-
Caster, EpiSPIDER, and the now-defunct Google Flu Trends can thus be conceptualised
as new governmental technologies of overarching global health security practices, de-
veloped and installed around yet unforeseen events in order to halt or preempt the
‘sudden, circular bolting’ of pandemic phenomena (Foucault 2007).
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Collectively then, in my view and building upon the expert points provided by Hen-
ning, processes of securitization of global health and the rise of preemptive security
logics have advanced calls for the deployment of novel security technologies and sur-
veillance apparatuses over the past two decades. These calls have been met with the
re-drawing of disease surveillance operations and the launching of new technologies
which now seemingly patrol digital datascapes in the surveillance of potential public
health emergencies. Such novel technologies constitute critical components of an
evolving ensemble of new governing practices, knowledges, techniques and rationalities
of health security, increasingly influenced by digitised, automated and computerized al-
gorithms. .
As components in an emergent socio-technological apparatus of security for the
strengthening of global health governmentalities, it is also crucial to consider the ways
in which these expanding digital syndromic surveillance systems re-contour previous
understandings of the temporalities, form and practice of preemption in the identifica-
tion of forthcoming pandemics. Firstly, the rise of syndromic surveillance technologies
for the forecasting of probable disease outbreaks, departs significantly from previous
methodologies to identify and further preempt pathogenic threats. As seen with the
steady integration of algorithmic programming over the past two decades from
ProMED-mail, to GPHIN, and to HealthMap, syndromic surveillance technologies in-
creasingly draw upon and aggregate open-source data pulled via algorithmic processing
from the realm of the digital to inform contemporary practices of health security in the
non-digital/physical world. Within the politics of preemption, this marks a novel transi-
tion towards the harnessing of infinite online data sources, afforded by increasingly so-
phisticated algorithms to identify unusual data correlations or patterns indicative of a
potential disease outbreak. In turn, this represents a process that is distinct and diver-
gent from previous methodologies of health surveillance which utilised clinical and la-
boratory testing, analysis, observation, and the collation of statistics in order to render
visible and intelligible, occurring or emergent infectious disease outbreaks. In the new
era of digital disease surveillance, the data warehouse emerges alongside the traditional
clinic as a new critical site of surveillance and zone of security praxis in the preemption
and surveying of disease risk.
Further to this, novel techniques to preempt looming pandemic threats via these
digital syndromic surveillance systems now also correspond with new problematiza-
tions of data and knowledge forms in the securitization of uncertain [pathogenic] fu-
tures. Unlike previous systems of infectious disease surveillance which were routinely
marked by an incompleteness of data in which to understand forthcoming pandemic
risks, the deluge of ‘Big Data’ of the early twenty-first century has now reversed this
problematization of data.. Contemporary digital disease surveillance systems and the
practice of health security are no longer hindered by a scarcity of data but rather bur-
dened by an excess of infinitely generating, unstructured and diffuse streams of digital
data. In order then to preempt and track the emergence of disease outbreaks in a
present world that is submerged in data sources, digital disease practices must navigate,
as Matteo Pasquinelli (2015) writes, ‘vast data oceans’ to detect that which constitutes
the anomaly, be it common patterns of behaviours in social media, buying or selling
tendencies in stock markets, the oscillation of temperatures in a specific region, or sus-
picious keywords in disease surveillance networks (ibid). Again, in this new practice of
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‘navigating vast data oceans’, the digital algorithm emerges once more as a strategic,
pragmatic and celebrated technology of government with the capacity to apprehend,
process and project new insights of disease patterns from troves of digital data which
manifest beyond human cognitive and analytic capacities.
Thus, the politics of preemption in the present era of elevated pandemic threat are
intimately intertwined with expanding recourses to apprehending Big Data sources and
employing algorithmic processing techniques to produce advanced alerts, indications
and insights of potential pathogenic uncertainties.
Indeed, during several critical public health emergencies over the past two decades, a
combination of Big Data sources and algorithmic techniques produced meaningful and
advanced insights into emergent public health emergencies, including during the early
and critical stages of the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in
China and Ebola in Guinea. However, the success and rise of the algorithm in these
health histories should not distract from the imperative for continued meaningful—and
indeed critical investigations and interrogations of emergent digital disease surveillance
practices which utilize diffuse Big Data sources and processing of such data streams via
algorithm.
Algorithms are not only famously opaque, but have also been shown to be cantanker-
ous, if not delicate technologies, illustrated famously by a false reporting of a cholera
outbreak in the United States by Google in 2007, as a result of Oprah Winfrey picking
Love in the Time of Cholera as book of the month in her book club (Simonsen et al.
2016). However, as technology and innovation advance, algorithms are getting smarter,
more insightful and more precise, but the growing commonplace of these knowledge
producing machines with intensifying technical complexities makes the monitoring and
regulation of these data-processing technologies ever the more urgent and vital.
The ascendancy of the era of Big Data and the rise of digital disease surveillance sys-
tems have afforded unprecedented new opportunities towards the enhancement and
bolstering of disease detection capacities in an era increasingly preoccupied with the
emergence of future security challenges—among them pandemic illness. The objective
of this discussion has been to provide an overview and highlight the potential gains and
benefits yielded by these new data sources and processing techniques, while also
emphasising that key ethical, legal, political and societal concerns abound and must not
be sidelined in contemporary efforts to accrue maximal data reserves and to effectively
track and detect the next pandemic before it occurs.
Summary
Tim
Dear Stephen, dear Henning, thank you very much for this inspiring conversation.
Again, it made clear the necessity of an interdisciplinary and social sciences inspired
debate about contemporary epidemiology and public health.
For me three insights emerge.
First of all, the gains in timeliness and scope of digital epidemiology come at the cost
of providing a different type of knowledge. The information provided through such sys-
tems is not the same as the traditional expert knowledge based on human assessment,
analysis, hypothesis, statistical testing and trials but an algorithmic ‘knowledge without
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truth’. The status of this knowledge may not be totally clear in all the different contexts
where it is used. This may result in ill-informed decision making.
A driving force for the demand of digital epidemiology is a reformulated conception
of global health. A common thread running through the diverse debates about global
health policies today is the issue of security. This securitization of global health does
frame current policies.
Specifically, threats to global health are increasingly identified as incalculable emer-
gencies (unknown unknowns). This results in a demand for preemptive ways to act on
those emergencies before they have evolved. This preemptive security logic also fosters
an unlimited big data surveillance as a practice of ‘navigating vast data oceans’.
For sure these points need further critical examination. Thus I am looking forward to
future interdisciplinary exchange and discussion.
Endnotes
1According to Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013) Dataification refers to the trans-
formation of social action into online quantified data, this allowing for the real-time
tracking and predictive analysis of events. (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013)
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